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Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy 
of Imagination, London: Routledge, 2016, 482 pp.
The book is extremely rich. Given that it contains thirty papers, I shall be 
able to say something only about a part of it. For instance, I shall here for 
the reasons of space have to skip the rich and interesting Part I, dedicated 
to historical treatments of imagination, featuring papers on Aristotle (by 
Deborah K.W. Modrak), Descartes (by Dennis L. Sepper), Hume (by Fabian 
Dorsch), Kant (by Samantha Matherne), Husserl (by Julia Jansen) and Sar-
tre (by Robert Hopkins).
Let me pass directly to Part II, dedicated to contemporary discussions of 
imagination. The fi rst paper, “Imagination and mental imagery” by Domi-
nic Gregory stresses the important role of mental images, but adds that 
“there are, (…), reasons for thinking that sensory mental imagery is not 
essential to the imagination, (…) The relationships between sensory mental 
imagery and the imagination are thus notably complex and—like so many 
of the philosophical areas to which the imagination is central—ripe for fur-
ther investigation” (107). Bence Nanay in chapter 9, “Imagination and per-
ception” also focuses on image-based imagination. With apologies, I shall 
skip interesting chapter on “Imagination and belief” by Neil Sinhababu, the 
one on “Imagination and memory” by Dorothea Debus, one on “Imagina-
tion, dreaming, and hallucination” by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and the 
fi nal one, by the editor of the volume, “Desire like imagination”, and recom-
mend them to reader’s attention. I also skip part III Imagination in aesthet-
ics, with interesting papers by Nick Wiltsher and Aaron Meskin, James O. 
Young, Kathleen Stock and Stacie Friend.
So, we now pass to Part IV, “Imagination in philosophy of mind and cog-
nitive science”. Let us start from a paper that raises some epistemologically 
crucial issues. What is the relationship between imagination and rational 
thought? Are they connected and if yes, what does connect them? Ruth M.J. 
Byrne, in her “Imagination and rationality” suggests “that counterfactuals 
provide an important bridge between reasoning and imagination …” (339). 
The rationale is the following: “Imagination and reasoning depend on the 
same sorts of underlying computational processes: reasoning depends on 
cognitive processes that support the imagination of alternatives, and imagi-
nation depends on cognitive processes that are based on the same core pro-
cesses”. (Ibid.) She notes that imagination shows an interesting structure: 
“Remarkably, most people tend to change the same sorts of things in their 
representation of reality when they imagine an alternative to it, almost as 
if there were “fault lines” in their representation of reality, junctures or 
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joints that most people zoom in on to imagine how things could have taken 
a different turn” (341).
Now, what are the “core processes” that support our imagination of al-
ternatives? Byrne appeals to the notion of mental model that she has been 
developing for decades together with Philip Johnson Laird. The crucial 
claim is that “people make inferences by constructing and combining men-
tal models.” (348). A mental model is an iconic or analog device, it looks 
(at least to me) that this iconic character is in many respect analogous to 
image-based of pictorial nature of many episodes of imagining.
It seems that Byrne supports a strong claim: the thinker does not rea-
son about the model using non-iconic devices (a digital language, or…), but 
rather in the model; however, the phrasing is mine, not Byrne’s, and she 
is not very explicit about the matter. However, her work does point in this 
direction, and this is the way she and Johnson Laird are standardly under-
stood (e.g. by Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen in their (2008) 
book, Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science, A Bradford book, MIT, 
ch.10.6). Let me call this view “the pure model-theoretic view of inferences”.
Let me note that there is an obvious, more “hybrid” alternative, which 
sees iconic model as indispensable starting point for reasoning, but leaves 
space for computational, for instance deductive or propositional, variants 
of reasoning. Stenning and van Lambalgen argue that the need for such 
reasoning is present even in the original iconic case, and criticize Byrne 
and Johnson Laird for not having noticed it. Authors that Byrne herself 
quotes, J.S.B.T Evans, and D.E. Over, lean more in the same direction. 
Evans, for instance, describes his models as “epistemic”, represented what 
thinker takes oneself to believe; this allows assignation of degrees of belief 
to the model, and then thinker’s probabilistic reasoning about mental mod-
els, rather than in them. Thomas Metzinger seems to go in the same direc-
tion (e.g. in his Being no one-The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2004), 
A Bradford book, p. 62), and the more recent work by Jakob Hohwy (in his 
The Predictive Mind from 2013, OUP) is dedicated to the analysis of hypo-
thetical very rich Bayesian reasoning allegedly done by thinker’s cognitive 
machinery over the initial perception grounded mental model(s). (See also 
Chris Frith (2007), Making up the Mind How the Brain Creates our Mental 
World, Blackwell, p. 126ff.)
The hybrid alternative is slowly winning.
The authors just mentioned do not talk much about imagination. How 
would the “hybrid” approach answer Byrne’s initial question concerning the 
bridge between reasoning and imagination? One could bring together two 
kinds of processes: fi rst, the imaginative reasoning grounded in image-like 
pictorial episodes, and second, the ordinary reasoning grounded in iconic 
mental models. The second element can be understood either in the pure 
(Johnson Laird, R. Byrne) way, or in the hybrid way. The two elements 
seem analogous, and one might suppose that there are causal connections 
between some episodes of the fi rst, and some of the second element. Sup-
pose, to borrow an example from Tim Williamson, that I ask myself the 
following vital question: “Can I jump across the river?” I imagine myself 
jumping from here, or from there, or from a more distant bend. Imagination 
caters for the singularity of the confi guration: this shape of the riverbank 
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here, the other shape, and so on. I conclude with a counterfactual: Were I to 
jump from here, I would break my leg.
On the hybrid view, I need information about probabilities, and, equal-
ly on the hybrid view, it comes from my spatial-kinematic-and-dynamical 
mental models. (I might build three models on the spot, using perceptual 
material plus memory material from my mountaineering experiences). My 
cognitive mental computer calculates some constraints, Bayesian or others, 
valid for (on) such models. The models are then stored in my memory, and 
they will constrain my imagination next time when I fi nd myself in a same 
or similar situation. Imagination feeds models (helps build them) and mod-
els, on their part, constrain the exercise of the imagination.
Several papers in the present part concern the role of imagination in 
understanding other people and our reactions to them. The central phenom-
enon in play here is mental simulation.
In her chapter “Simulation theory” Shannon Spaulding offers clarifi ca-
tory and classifi catory information that is extremely useful, given that the 
term “simulation” is used in many senses in the literature, and there is 
clear need to distinguish them to avoid very bad confusions (her own stance, 
critical toward the power of simulation, is put forward in her contribution to 
another collection, due to A. Kind and Peter Kung, (2016), Knowledge and 
imagination, OUP).
Spaulding starts from Alvin Goldman’s proposal according to which a 
process P simulates process P’ if and only if fi rst P duplicates, replicates, or 
resembles P’ in some signifi cant respect and two, in its duplication of P’, P 
fulfi lls one of its purposes or functions. In the case of mindreading simula-
tion, the purpose or function of is to understand target’s mental states. She 
then introduces the crucial distinction between abstract and concrete simu-
lation, the fi rst including activities like computer simulation and the like, 
and the second being the psychological simulation that involves “sameness 
of system and fi ne grained process” (264). The distinction is very helpful, 
and could save writers from confusions that mark the scene of present-day 
investigation of simulation.
Spaulding next distinguishes high-level from low-level simulation. She 
lists three characteristics of the former. First, it “involves imagination in 
the conventional sense” (267).    Second, it explains our engagement with fi c-
tion, where we put ourselves “in the fi ctional character’s position and imag-
ine what we would think, feel, and do in that situation. Third, it explains 
how one can get knowledge through simulational imagination, so that if 
could be “co- opted to explain how some thought experiments work” (267). 
In contrast, in low level simulation, “imagination operates unconsciously 
and automatically.”
Let me mention papers which I did not review here. First, the paper on 
“The cognitive architecture of imaginative resistance” by Kengo Miyazono 
and Shen yi Liao, that I shall say a few words about in a moment. Next, 
“Imagination and the Self” by Dilip Ninan, Greg Currie’s “Imagination and 
Learning”, Neil Van Leeuwen’s “Imagination and action”, Deena Skolnick 
Weisberg’s “Imagination and child development” and fi nally “Imagination 
and pretense” by Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers, and “Can ani-
mals imagine?” by Robert W. Mitchell.
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Part V is dedicated to imagination in ethics, moral psychology, and po-
litical philosophy. Next two papers that I want to mention explore the con-
sequences of mind-reading, especially the moral ones. Karsten R. Stueber 
in her “Empathy and the imagination” stresses the central importance of 
empathy for gaining access to other minds, and for linking us to our com-
munity. She leaves open the question “whether or not empathy has a more 
foundational role to play in constituting moral normativity” (377).
In his chapter on “Moral imagination” Mark Johnson provides a positive 
answer to the question and offers a sketch of an extremely pro-imagination 
oriented theory, of the kind he developed in his Morality for humans (2014) 
book. “Moral imagination”, he writes “is our fundamental capacity to imag-
ine how certain values and commitments are likely to play out in future 
experience…” (263). The quality of our moral thinking is thus “as much an 
affair of imagination as it is an appropriation of prior knowledge” (Ibid.). A 
crucial role in moral understanding is thus assigned to one particular kind 
of imagination, namely simulational, “empathetic” imagination. Indeed, 
moral deliberation itself is a process of “cognitive conative affective simula-
tion. Simulation “activates emotional responses to the projected situations”, 
thus permitting us “to give voice to various impulses, interests, and values 
...” (364).
Unfortunately, Johnson does not clearly tell us how the emotional re-
sponse to a situation, imagined or real, is related to its value. Empathy 
with a suffering person can tell me immediately that her situation is bad, 
of negative value, but this is just the beginning of the story. Is the ‘telling’ 
simply recording of a given axiological state, or is it, or some its more ideal-
ized version, constitutive of the value? Next, what about non-empathetic 
simulation? I imaginatively simulate the behavior of sea captains who are 
saving refugees in the Mediterranean, and I feel admiration for their action, 
experience it as being of a very high value. What is the relationship between 
simulation, admiration and value? In the paper, Johnson shows sympathy 
towards a reductionist account, that would explain value in terms of our 
coping with the world, but he does not develop it suffi ciently for a curious 
reader.
As far as other prominent ethical alternatives are concerned, Johnson is 
very critical of what he calls “Moral Law” theory, with its abstract guiding 
principles. The reader rightly wonders how he would react to the Rawlsian 
attempt at reconciliation of various sources of moral wisdom. The attempt 
famously involves three elements: our spontaneous intuitions, the veil-of-
ignorance procedure, which is itself simulation-involving (imagine yourself 
not knowing your particular characteristics, and imagine yourself living in 
such-and-such arrangement) but not empathetic, and the process of testing 
principles with the help of spontaneous intuitions. We can imagine that 
many spontaneous intuitions (“This is, or would be, a terrible deed!”) come 
from empathetic simulation; principles come from neutral, veil-of-ignorance 
simulation procedure and the testing brings these components together. 
How close this alternative comes to Johnson’s ideal would be a fi ne thing 
to know.
Part VI is dedicated to Imagination in epistemology, philosophy of sci-
ence, and philosophy of mathematics, encompassing the paper by Greg Cur-
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rie “Imagination and learning”, Roy Sorensen  “Thought experiment and 
imagination”, Peter Kung “Imagination and modal epistemology”, Adam 
Toon, “Imagination in scientifi c modeling” and Andrew Arana “Imagination 
in mathematics”. Let me conclude by mentioning two claims by Sorensen 
which I fi nd very congenial. First, he proposes that „we can run simulations 
that have some reliability because our imagination has been shaped by the 
environment.” And notes that experience can improve the fi t (431). He also 
praises modeling, noting that it “improves on the mind’s eye level of reso-
lution” and re-organizes our spatial imagination in a positive way. Model-
ing also overcomes our spatial imagination’s bias in favor of alignment and 
against tilts (426). He is adamant about the role of evolution in shaping our 
imaginative capacities and making them fi t the world. I agree completely.
In short, it is a very impressive collection on the epistemology of imagi-
nation, indispensable for anyone who is interested in the methodology of 
philosophy. I recommend it warmly to the attention of the readers.
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